Extensive work in the last two decades has led to deep insights into the worst case complexity of computing Nash equilibria (NE). However, largely negative results have raised the need for beyond worst-case analysis of these problems.
Introduction
Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts of game theory. Extensive work within the field of Algorithmic Game Theory has been done to study the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria (NE) in various game models (see Section 1.1 for a detailed discussion). Most problems of this form are shown to be complete for some class in "Total-Function NP" 1 , typically either PPAD or PLS e.g., [FPT04, DGP09, CDT06a, CDT06b, SV08, KT10, EY10, Syr10, Meh14] . The class PPAD captures problems with parity arguments like finding fixed-points of continuous functions, Sperner's Lemma, and finding (mixed) Nash equilibria in general games [Pap94, KPR + 13, DGP09, CDT06a, Gol11], while PLS (Polynomial Local Search) captures problems with localsearch algorithms, like local-max-cut, local-max-SAT, and pure NE in potential/congestion games [JPY88, SY91, FPT04, SV08, CD11].
Although it is well accepted that PPAD and PLS are unlikely to be in P [BCE + 98, BPR15, Rub17] , problems in these classes admit respectively path-following style complementary pivot algorithms [LH64, GW03, AGMS11, GJM11] and local-search-type algorithms [JPY88] . The localsearch algorithms for PLS problems are naturally defined, and many are empirically observed to be fast [JPY88, CDRP08, DFIS16] . However, these algorithms take exponential time in the worst case [SY91, SvS04] . Several famous algorithms, the classical Simplex method for solving Linear Programs among them, behave similarly. To study this phenomenon, Spielman and Teng introduced a powerful model of Smoothed analysis, which "continuously interpolates between the worst-case and average-case analyses of algorithms," [ST04] . The basic idea is to formally show that adversarial instances are "sparse and scattered," in a probabilistic sense. This gives rise to the following question:
Question. Can we design smoothed efficient algorithms for finding Nash equilibria?
In this paper we answer the question in the affirmative for network-coordination games, a wellstudied model (see e.g. [CD11] and [SW16] ) which succinctly captures pairwise coordination in multi-player games. In particular, we obtain smoothed (quasi-)polynomial time algorithms to find pure Nash equilibria (PNE) in network-coordination games (NetCoordNash) with constantly many strategies, a PLS-complete problem in the worst case [CD11] . To the best of our knowledge this gives the first smoothed efficient algorithm for a "hard" Nash equilibrium problem.
Smoothed Analysis. The work of Spielman and Teng [ST04] , that introduced the smoothed analysis framework, studied the classical Simplex method for linear programs (LP). They reasoned that, if the algorithm performs badly only on sparsely distributed instances, then this would explain the observation that the Simplex method performs well in practice. Towards this goal, they showed that given an LP instance, when independently random perturbations are introduced into all entries of the constraint matrix (referred to as a smoothed instance), then the Simplex method, implemented with the shadow-pivot rule, finds a solution in polynomial time, both in expectation as well as with high probability. Here, the running time of the algorithm depends polynomially on the density of the perturbation: as the variance of the perturbation approaches zero, the density grows unboundedly, and the instance approaches a non-perturbed instance. This is known as smoothed complexity of the problem, and has been accepted as the strongest guarantee one can hope for beyond worst-case guarantees. In the past decade and a half, much work has sought to obtain smoothed efficient algorithms when worst-case analysis seems infeasible [DMadHR + 03, BV04, MR05, RV07, AV09, ERV14, ER14, ABPW17], including for integer programming, binary search trees, iterative-closest-point (ICP) algorithms, the 2-OPT algorithm for the Traveling Salesman problem (TSP), the random knapsack problem and the local-max-cut problem.
In case of Nash equilibrium computation, smoothed complexity of two-player games is known to not lie in P unless RP=PPAD [CDT06a] . This problem is PPAD-complete in the worst case, while NetCoordNash is a PLS-complete problem. Note that, problems in PLS, unlike PPAD, always admits a potential function which measures the progress of a local-search algorithm to solve the problem. This is reminiscent of the objective function of the LPs, which must increase with every step of the Simplex method. Leveraging this, two smoothed efficient algorithms were obtained for the local-max-cut, a classical PLS-complete problem where, given a weighted graph the goal is to find a cut that can not be improved by moving any one vertex across the cut. First, Etscheid and Röglin [ER14] showed that the FLIP algorithm, which in every step flips the cut-side of one vertex if it improves the cut value, terminates in quasi-polynomial time with high probability, when the edge weights are perturbed. A recent second result by Angel, Bubeck, Peres, and Wei [ABPW17] showed polynomial run-time for the same algorithm when weights of all edges are perturbed, viewing missing edges as zero-weight edges. We note that the simultaneous perturbation of all input parameters seems to be crucial in getting smoothed polynomial time algorithms so far, e.g., see [BD02, ST04, SST06] .
Summary of Results.
In this paper, we analyze the smoothed complexity of NetCoordNash, which we recall is also PLS-complete. An instance of NetCoordNash is represented by an undirected game graph G = (V, E), where the nodes are the players, and every node v ∈ V plays a two-player coordination game with each of its neighbors. If every player has k strategies to choose from, then the game on each edge (u, v) can be represented by a k × k payoff matrix A uv . Once every player chooses a strategy, the payoff value for each edge is fixed, and each player gets the sum of the payoffs on its incident edges. The goal is to find a pure NE of this game. We analyze the problem through two different approaches: (i) direct smoothed analysis of an algorithm, and (ii) through reductions.
We first analyze a local-search algorithm called better-response (BRA), where players take turns making improving moves (termed better-response moves), while all other players remain fixed. The sum of payoffs across all the edges acts as a potential function measuring the progress of the algorithm, i.e. the function value increases every time a player makes a better-response move (see Section 2.1).
For games with constant k, we show that when for all uv ∈ E, all payoff entries of A uv are perturbed independently at random, then any better-response algorithm converges in quasi-polynomial time with high probability. Furthermore, if either G is a complete graph, or we consider it as a complete graph by taking A uv to be an all zero matrix for the edges that are not present, then the algorithm takes polynomial time with high probability. To get these results, we develop a technique to bound the probability that a sufficiently long sequence of better-response moves makes little improvement to the value of the potential function. This technique may be applicable to analyze the smoothed complexity of other potential/congestion games. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first smoothed efficient algorithm for a Nash equilibrium problem that is hard in the worst-case.
We note that local-max-cut reduces to a special case of network-coordination game where every player has 2 strategies [CD11] , as shown in Figure 1 . The two strategies represent which side of the cut each node is on, and the payoff matrix on every edge is symmetric with zeros on the diagonal. Thus, a network-coordination game with constant number of strategies (k), significantly generalizes the local-max-cut problem. In both of our results, the analysis is based on a non-trivial extensions of the approaches for local-max-cut [ABPW17, ER14] . Our second approach to the analysis of smoothed complexity is through reductions. For us, the obvious choice of problem to reduce to is local-max-cut, however now the reduction has to be from network-coordination game to local-max-cut. Furthermore, the reduction should ensure that independent perturbations in the parameters of the former produce independent perturbation of all edge weights in the latter problem, among other things. We call such a reduction smoothness-preserving, and obtain two such reductions: (i) from 2-strategy network-coordination games to local-max-cut, and (ii) general k-strategy network-coordination games to local-max-cut up-to-two-flips. (i.e. cuts whose value cannot be improved by moving any two vertices.) We show that the first reduction, together with the results of [ABPW17, ER14] for local-max-cut, gives an alternate smoothed analysis of the best-response algorithm for a 2-strategy network-coordination game. However, for general network-coordination games, we would have to show that local-max-cut up-to-two-flips also has polynomial smoothed complexity, where the local improvement algorithm flips two vertices in every step. We leave this as an open question.
Related Work
The works most related to ours are of [ER14] and [ABPW17] . As discussed in the previous section, both study the smoothed complexity of the local-max-cut, which is also PLS-complete. The first gives a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for local-max-cut on arbitrary graphs, and the second, a polynomial time algorithm in the case of complete graphs. Since network-coordination game significantly generalizes the local-max-cut problem, more novel techniques and ideas are needed for our analysis to go through. However, a common theme among these three results, as well as the work of Spielman and Teng for Simplex [ST04] , is that they all track improvement in some function which acts as a measure of progress.
Independently, Bibaksereshkeh, Carlson, and Chandrasekaran [BCC18] 2 improved the runningtime analysis for the local-max-cut algorithm, and obtained smoothed polynomial and quasipolynomial algorithms for local-3-cut and local-k-cut respectively. In local-k-cut the goal is to find a k-partition of the vertices such that the total weight of edges crossing any partition can not be improved by moving any one vertex. It is easy to see that local-k-cut for any k reduces to k-strategy network-coordination games, where the weight w uv for edge uv translates to a payoff matrix A uv in the game, where A uv (i, j) = 0 if i = j, and w uv otherwise. Thus, network-coordination games significantly generalize k-cuts. On the other hand, this reduction is not smoothness-preserving, and hence our smoothed efficient algorithm is not directly applicable to solve the local-k-cut problem.
Like network-coordination game, there has been extensive work on various other potential games, equivalently congestion games (e.g., [Ros73, MS96, RT02, FPT04, CMN05] ), capturing routing and traffic situations (e.g., [Smi79, DN84, Rou07, HS10, HHKS13]), and resource allocation under strategic agents (e.g., [JT04, FT12] ). Unlike general games, existence of the potential function ensures that these games always have a pure NE [Ros73] . Finding pure NE is typically PLS-complete [FPT04, CD11] , while finding any NE, mixed or pure, is known to be in CLS [DP11] , a class at the intersection of PPAD and PLS. The average case complexity of a random potential game was shown to be polynomial in the number of players and strategies by Durand and Gaujal recently [DG16] . Another series of remarkable works have studied the loss in welfare at NE through the notions of Price-of-Anarchy and Price-of-Stability (e.g., [KP99, RT02, CK05, ADG + 06, ADK + 08]). To the best of our knowledge no smoothed complexity results are known for these games, and our approach to analyze potential increase may provide ways to obtain smoothed efficient algorithms for other potential games.
The only known smoothed complexity of finding NE is for two-player games; which are nonpotential games in general. Chen, Deng, and Teng [CDT06a] showed that this problem does not have polynomial smoothed complexity unless RP=PPAD. While, towards average case analysis Bárány, Vempala, and Vetta [BVV07] showed that a game picked uniformly at random has a NE with support size two for both the players whp. Worst case complexity of NE computation in general non-potential games has been studied extensively. The computation is typically PPAD-complete, even for various special cases (e.g., [AKV05, CDT06b, Meh14] ) and approximation (e.g., [CDT06a, Rub18] ). On the other hand efficient algorithms have been designed for interesting sub-classes (e.g., [KT07, TS07, IKL + 11, AGMS11, CD11, CCDP15, ADH + 16, BB17, Bar18]), exploiting the structure of NE for the class to either enumerate, or through other methods such as parameterized LP and binary search. For two-player games, Lipton, Mehta, and Markakis gave a quasi-polynomial time algorithm to find a constant approximate Nash equilibrium [LMM03] . Recently, Rubinstein [Rub17] showed this to be the best possible assuming exponential time hypothesis for PPAD, and Kothari and Mehta [KM18] showed a matching unconditional hardness under the powerful algorithmic framework of Sum-of-Squares with oblivious rounding and enumeration. Lower bounds in approximation under well-accepted assumptions, like NP-hardness, SETH, and planted-clique, has also been studied for the decision versions of the problem, e.g., if there exist more than one equilibrium, equilibrium with payoff at least h, etc. [GZ89, CS08, HK11, BKW15, DFS16].
Game Model, Smoothed Analysis, and Statement of Results
In this section we discuss the Network Coordination Games, the notion of smoothed analysis, and state our main contributions.
Notation:
In what follows, the set {1, . . . , k} is denoted as [k] , and ., . denotes inner product.
Nash Equilibria in Network Coordination Games
A game with two players, where each player has k strategies, can be defined by two k × k payoff matrices (A, B), one for each player. It is called a coordination game if A = B. We assume without loss of generality that every player has the same number of strategies.
k-network-coordination game. A network-coordination game is a multi-player extension of coordination games. The game is specified by an underlying undirected graph G = (V, E), where the nodes are players, and each edge represents a two-player coordination game between its endpoints. A k-network-coordination game is where each player has k strategies, and the edge games are represented by k × k matrices A uv . If u plays i ∈ [k] and v plays j ∈ [k] then both get payoff A u,v (i, j) on this edge; we will sometimes denote this by A((u, i)(v, j)) to disambiguate. Now on we will think of A as an |E|k 2 -length vector representing all payoff values of all such edge games. Nash equilibria are invariant to shifting and scaling of the payoffs, so w.l.o.g. we assume every entry of vector A is contained in [−1, 1]. Let n = |V |. A strategy profile is a vector σ ∈ [k] n where each player chooses a strategy from [k] . The payoff of player u is then:
Nash Equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile no player can improve her payoff by deviating unilaterally. In general, NE strategy profiles may be randomized. However, a NE where every player chooses a strategy deterministically is called pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Formally, strategy profile σ is a PNE, if and only if
where σ −u denotes the strategies of all the players in σ except u. In Potential Games [Ros73], PNE's are known to always exist. Such a game admits a potential function which encodes the individual "progress" of the players, i.e. ∃g :
, is a pure NE.
Lemma 2.1 ([CD11]). Network Coordination Games are potential games, and the corresponding potential function is the total payoff of all the players (up to a factor 2)
Our goal is to find a pure NE for a given k-network-coordination game.
Better-Response Algorithm (BR alg., or BRA). Another immediate consequence of being a potential game is that, for any strategy profile σ, if some player u can deviate to σ ′ u and improve her payoff, then the move σ u → σ ′ u is termed a better-response (BR) move for player u from strategy profile σ. Clearly, under such a BR move, the potential function value increases, i.e.,
Note that payoff(σ) may only take k n possible values. Hence, if a BR move is made whenever possible, the players must converge to a local-optimal of the potential function, or equivalently, to a pure NE of the game, albeit in possibly exponential (k n in the worst case) steps. This gives a local-search based better-response algorithm to solve k-NetCoordNash.
Smoothed Analysis
The notion of smoothed analysis was introduced by Spielman and Teng [ST04] to bridge the gap between average-and worst-case analysis. For a search problem P let (I, X) be an instance where I is possibly discrete information, and X is a real-valued vector whose dimension depends on I. For example, in the case of a k-network-coordination games, I consists of the game graph G and the number of strategies k, and X is the payoff vector A.
Definition 2.1 (Polynomial Smoothed Complexity w.h.p. or in expectation). Let (I, X) be a random instance of P, where I is chosen arbitrarily, and X is a random real-valued vector whose entries are independent random variables with density at most φ.
If there exists an algorithm that can solve arbitrary instances of P in finite time, and for all I, solves the random input (I, X) in time at most (φ · |I| · |X|) c with probability at least 1−1/poly(φ, I, X), where c > 0 is a constant, then P is said to have polynomial smoothed complexity w.h.p. If the runtime is similarly bounded in expectation, then P is said to have polynomial smooth complexity in expectation.
Standard (Turing) reductions between two search problems P and Q are well-defined, and commonly used to either extend an algorithm of Q to solve instances of P, or to imply hardness for Q given hardness for P. We extend this notion to define smoothness preserving reductions. Definition 2.2 (Strong and Weak Smoothness-Preserving Reductions). A randomized, smoothnesspreserving reduction from a search problem P to problem Q is defined by poly-time computable functions f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 , and a real probability space Ω ⊆ R d , such that,
• For any (I, X) ∈ P, and for arbitrary R ∈ Ω, f 1 (I), f 2 (X, R) is an instance of Q, whose solution σ maps to a solution f 3 (σ) of (I, X).
• Whenever the entries of X and R are drawn independently at random from distributions with density at most φ, then f 2 (X, R) has entries which are independent random variables with density at most poly(φ, |X|, |R|). This is called strong reduction.
• If the entries of f 2 (X, R) are not independent, but instead are linearly independent combinations of entries of X and R, and the density is similarly bounded, then call it weak reduction.
d-FlipMaxCut. Extending the notion of local-max-cut [SY91] , we define the d-FlipMaxCut problem, given by an undirected graph G = (V, E) with edge weights w uv for all uv ∈ E. The goal is to find a non-empty subset S V of vertices, such that δ(S) := uv∈E:u∈S,v / ∈S w uv is a local optimum up to d-flips, i.e., δ(S) ≥ δ(S ′ ) for all S ′ ⊂ V such that S and S ′ differ by at most d vertices, or
For a constant d, the d-FlipMaxCut problem admits a natural FLIP algorithm, which like the BR algorithm, will check whether there exists a local improvement, and move the candidate solution to the improved solution until no local improvement is possible. The smoothed complexity of the FLIP algorithm for 1-FlipMaxCut is analyzed in the papers of [ER14] and [ABPW17] .
Our Results
Our main results are smoothed efficient algorithms, and smoothness-preserving reductions for k-network-coordination games. We formally define the smoothed problem here:
Smoothed k-NetCoordNash. Given a k-network-coordination game represented by an undirected graph G = (V, E) and an (|E|k 2 )-dimensional payoff vector A, where each entry of A is an independent random variable supported on the interval [−1, 1] with density at most φ, find a PNE.
Since the real-valued input to the smoothed k-NetCoordNash problem is stochastic, the running time of the algorithm that solves it will be stochastic, and the guarantees will be stated either w.h.p. or in expectation (Definition 2.1). Our first result shows quasi-polynomial complexity for the BRA.
Theorem 2.2. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of a BR algorithm where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most φ · (nk) O(k log(nk)) steps, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k).
We note that the probability value in the above statement is over the possible choices of payoff values for the Network game, and not over executions of the BR algorithm. This statement holds true regardless of how BRA is implemented, even adversarially. Next we show polynomial smoothed complexity for games with complete game graph G. Alternatively (and more commonly), if an edge uv is not present in G, then the corresponding payoff matrix is considered as an all-zero payoff matrix, and its entries are equally perturbed. This fits the model of all known smoothed polynomial-time algorithms (e.g. [ST04, ABPW17, BCC18]) which do require every parameter to be perturbed. For example, the poly-time results for local-max-cut assume that the underlying graph is complete [ABPW17, BCC18] . Theorem 2.3. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash on a complete game graph, and with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of BRA where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most (nkφ) O(k) steps, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k, φ).
We extend Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 using a meta-theorem, to show results in expectation.
Theorem 2.4. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of BRA where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most O(φ) · (nk) O(k log(nk)) steps in expectation. Furthermore, if the game graph is complete, it will converge in at most (nkφ) O(1) steps in expectation.
Remark 1. We have assumed, above, that the entries of A are supported on a small range. This is purely for mathematical convenience as it easily bounds the maximum improvement. It would have sufficed to assume that the random variables have sub-Gaussian tails, though we omit this analysis.
Our second set of results analyzes smoothness-preserving reductions for the k-NetCoordNash problem. First we show a meta-theorem.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose problem Q has (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity. Then, if problem P admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to Q, then P also has (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity. If instead, P admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut on an (arbitrary) complete graph, then P again has a (quasi)polynomial smoothed complexity.
The above theorem allows us to extend smoothed-efficient algorithms from one problem to another through smoothness-preserving reductions. Recall, 1-FlipMaxCut is local-max-cut. Theorem 2.6. 2-NetCoordNash admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to 1-FlipMaxCut.
The FLIP algorithm for 1-FlipMaxCut has smoothed quasi-polynomial running time in general [ER14] , and smoothed polynomial running time if G is a complete graph [ABPW17] . A recent result [BCC18] seems to have improved the running time of the latter, and so this reduction allows us to provide better bounds on the performance of BRA in the case k = 2. These results, together with Theorems 2.5 and 2.6, gives an alternate smoothed efficient algorithm for the 2-NetCoordNash problem. However, for k > 2, the reduction requires 2-FlipMaxCut, which is not yet known to have (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity.
Theorem 2.7. k-NetCoordNash admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to 2-FlipMaxCut.
Though this result does not immediately provide an algorithm to solve k-NetCoordNash, we show that it does raise the following implication: If we can show that the 2-FLIP algorithm solves smoothed instances of 2-FlipMaxCut in (quasi-)polynomial time through rank-based analysis similar to FLIP, then NetCoordNash has (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity for k in the input, rather than fixed k. We leave the smoothed analysis of 2-FlipMaxCut as an open problem.
Technical Overview
Our main results establish smoothed efficient algorithms and smoothness-preserving reductions for the k-NetCoordNash problem. We start with an overview of the former.
Smoothed Analysis of the Better-Response Algorithm
In this section we discuss main techniques behind proving Theorems 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4; all details and proofs can be found in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. These theorems establish smoothed (quasi-)polynomial complexity of the better-response algorithm for the k-NetCoordNash problem on (in-)complete game graphs, for fixed k. Recall that in every step of the BR algorithm, some player makes an improving move, which implies an increase in the potential function (1).
We first discuss the approach behind the first two theorems which prove the result with high probability (whp). We build on the remarkable work of [ER14] , analyzing the FLIP algorithm for the local-max-cut problem. The main idea is to show that when the input is stochastic with bounded density, then every long enough (i.e. linear-sized) sequence of FLIP will improve the cut with at least 1/quasi − poly value, whp. Since the cut value is bounded above, the algorithm must terminate in quasi-polynomial time, again whp. [ABPW17] extended this analysis to show 1/poly improvement and thereby obtained a polynomial run-time. For a given k-network-coordination game, we will show a similar result for the potential value (1) under the BR algorithm. For this, it suffices to bound the probability that any long improving sequence achieves small potential increase. To show this, all three papers crucially use the following probabilistic lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Lemma A.1 [ER14] ). Let X ∈ R d be a vector of d independent random variables where each X i has density bounded by φ. Let α 1 , . . . , α r be r linearly independent vectors in Z d . then the joint density of ( α i , X ) i∈[r] is bounded by φ r , and for any given b 1 , b 2 , . . . ∈ R and ǫ > 0,
Recall that the stochastic input in our case is the payoff vector A whose every coordinate is a random variable with density bounded by φ. To apply the above lemma, we need to: (i) model the potential increase in every BR step as a linear combination of the coordinates of A, and (ii), show that these linear combinations for a fixed BR sequence of length Θ(nk), when seen as a matrix, have high rank, implying that a large number of steps in the sequence are "independent" (i.e. the change in potential value with each move does not depend on that of other moves). Finally, we take a union bound over all possible sequences and starting configurations, to show that whp every BR sequence of length Θ(nk) has large improvement. If we can ensure the improvement ǫ > 0 to be at least 1/(quasi)poly, then we get overall (quasi)polynomial running time with high probability.
To prove the rank and the union bound, we extend the methods of [ER14] and [ABPW17] . The main difficulty in this extension is that an improving move in the network-coordination setting specifies both a player u and her improving strategy σ u , whereas an improving move in the FLIP algorithm for local-max-cut in [ER14, ABPW17] need only specify the node which is being swapped. Because of this, it turns out that our analysis, at times, requires counting the number of distinct players involved in some BR sequence, and at other times, the number of distinct player-strategy pairs present in the sequence, making the extension quite tricky and involved.
Remark 2. The rank analysis has bounds in terms of the number of distinct players, and not the number of distinct player-strategy pairs. The union bound, however, is in terms of the number of distinct moves. If a sequence has p distinct players, trivially the number of distinct moves is at most pk, which results in the factor k appearing in the exponent of the final time bounds.
In all that follows, we represent each BR move by a player-strategy pair (u, i), denoting that player u is replacing strategy σ u by i, (assuming i = σ u ). We also denote as σ t the strategy profile after the t th BR move. Formally, σ 0 is the initial strategy profile, and if the move at time t is given by (u t , i t ), then σ t := (i t , σ t−1 −ut ). The change in the potential function at this step is then given by payoff(σ t ) − payoff(σ t−1 ), which is clearly an integer linear combination of the A uv (i, j) payoff values. Since the combinations have integer coefficients, the total improvement (a random variable) has density at most φ as well. For any fixed BR sequence S of length 2nk, we define these linear combinations as the set of vectors L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . }, where L t ∈ {−1, 0, 1} (|E|×k 2 ) , ∀t ∈ [2nk], with entries indexed by each of the payoff values. The values of its entries are chosen as follows:
if: u t ∈ {u, v} and σ t u = i and σ t v = j. −1 if: u t ∈ {u, v} and σ t−1
That is, every entry signifies if the corresponding payoff value gets added, removed, or unchanged, from the potential function. The inner product L t , A gives the change in the total payoff of the player who makes a move at time t, and thus, the increase in potential due to the t th move.
Each of the inner products L t , A can be shown to be unlikely to take values in the range (0, ǫ] by the assumption of bounded density. To argue that L has high rank, we partition all players who make a move in the sequence into two sets: those players who never play the same strategy twice throughout the whole sequence (non-repeating players), and those players who do (repeating players). We will denote these quantities as p 1 and p 2 respectively, and compute the rank separately for the following four cases:
Case 1: The game graph G is not a complete graph (We a show an Ω(p/ log(p))-style rank bound).
Case 2: The game graph is complete (We show Ω(p) rank bound). We break this up into three cases: (a) every player moves at least once, (b) some player never changes strategy and p 2 ≥ p 1 , and (c) some player never changes strategy and p 1 ≥ p 2 .
Case 1: Arbitrary graph and quasi-polynomial bound. Our first lower bound on the number of independent moves is in terms of p 2 , in Lemma 4.2. We consider linear combinations of the vectors in L to obtain this. One key property of a BR sequence used here is that for some player u to return to a prior strategy, there must be some other player w who has changed their strategy since the last time u played this strategy, as otherwise the strategy profile would be repeating, which is impossible for BR sequences. We wish to show that the set L has high rank by finding a full-rank, diagonal submatrix. Taking the sum over all L entries corresponding to moves of player u between two consecutive occurrences of the same strategy will result in a vector which has non-zero entries in all rows corresponding to uw payoffs. However, u itself can be one of these w player for another vertex with a repeating strategy, and so it is necessary to match-up the repeating players, and only choose one per pair. This allows us to get a sub-matrix where each column (move) is the only one to have a non-zero entry in its associated row (payoff value/game).
Note that we have not shown that the columns in L have high rank, but instead, that span(L) contains at least p 2 /2 independent vectors. Combined with a simple pigeonhole like argument to prove the existence of at least O(log(nk)) repeating players in every sequence of length Θ(nk), we apply a naïve union bound over all sequences and establish quasi-polynomial smoothed time complexity of BRA whp, in Section 4.1 (Theorem 4.5). Thereby we show Theorem 2.2. This rank bound, by itself, is insufficient for a polynomial time bound, but for the case of complete graphs, higher rank bounds may be obtained:
Case 2: Complete graph and polynomial bound. In case 2(a), as proved in Lemma 4.6, it is easy to argue a minimum rank of n − 1 for vectors of L. For case 2(b), the rank obtained in Case 1 suffices. By combining cases 2(a) and 2(b) with a naïve union bound over all sequences with a fixed number of players, and all initial strategy profiles, we obtain the whp an arbitrary sequence with more than half of its players repeating, has large improvement. (Lemmas 4.6 and 4.10) Case 2(c). For a sequence when p 1 ≥ p 2 , the analysis is more involved. The rank bound is argued directly in terms of vectors in L, in Lemma 4.7, but it cannot be paired with the naïve union bound over the sequence and initial strategies, since the inner products L t , A depend on the strategies of the non-moving players. This would give a k n term which is far too large if p ≪ n. A better union bound is obtained in Lemma 4.11 by discretizing to the nearest multiple of ǫ the sum of payoff values due to non-moving players. Unfortunately, this leads to a (1/ǫ) ℓ term in the union bound, which cancels the (φǫ) r term of the probability value (2). Hence, to obtain a useful probability bound, the rank must be a constant fraction of p 1 plus the exponent in the union bound.
To analyze the rank, we first divide the sequence into blocks, where the endpoints of each block are the last occurrence of a non-repeating player in the BR sequence. (The blocks do not include these players' final moves). These blocks are termed transition blocks. It can be proved that the number of all distinct pairs except for pairs which return a player to the strategy she was playing at the beginning of the block, is a lower bound on the number of independent moves in the transition block. Every move of a non-repeating player is also independent of all these pairs, and is independent of other non-repeating players' moves.
To interpret this rank in terms of p 1 (alternatively p as p 1 ≥ p 2 ⇒ p 1 ≥ p/2), we require the length of the sequence to be bounded in terms of the number of distinct players it contains. For this, we define the notion of a critical block, as a contiguous subsequence within every BR sequence that has a large number of distinct players, and satisfies this property minimally. It can be proved that such a block will exist in every sequence of length Θ(nk). For critical blocks, the rank of Case 2(c) combined with its union bound gives the required bound on the probability of small improvement in potential of an arbitrary sequence.
The ranks obtained for cases 2(a) and 2(b) are applied along with Case 2(c) to the critical block itself, rather than the entire BR sequence. Since every Ω(nk)-length BR sequence must contain a critical block, this suffices to analyze the improvement of any sequence. The probability that a BR sequence has small improvement is at most the probability that some critical block within has small improvement. This is at most a union bound of the three cases. Taking a union bound over all possible critical blocks completes the analysis to bound the probability that any sequence of a sufficient length has a small improvement in potential (Lemma 4.12).
We assume that every payoff value for our network-coordination game is bounded, and therefore the sum of all payoffs is bounded. Since we have bounded the probability that any long BR sequence has small improvement, this bounds the probability that BRA runs for more-than-polynomially many moves, since the potential can only increase so much. Thereby we show Theorem 2.3.
Expected Time Analysis. The above analysis proves the w.h.p. aspect of the smoothed complexity. These results may be extended to establish bounds on the expected run-time of BRA as well. A naïve integration over the theorems as stated, however, does not immediately imply (quasi-)polynomial time in expectation. Instead, [ER14] has a more involved calculation which shows quasi-polynomial number of FLIP moves in expectation for local-max-cut. We abstract it and present the expected-time computation as a general theorem: it states that for any problem in PLS with bounded total improvement, a w.h.p. smoothed complexity bound implies and expected time bound (see Section 5). This, together with Theorems 2.2 and 2.3, implies Theorem 2.4.
Smoothness-Preserving Reduction to 1-and 2-FlipMaxCut
Recall the smoothness-preserving reductions defined in section 2.2. In this section, we discuss a meta-results showing the usefulness of these reductions (Theorem 2.5), and then give an overview of how to obtain such reductions for the k-NetCoordNash problem and prove Theorems 2.6 and 2.7. All the details and proofs are in Section 6.
Meta-results. In Theorem 2.5 we show two meta-results. First, if problem P admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to problem Q, and Q has smoothed polynomial algorithm in terms of whp, then so does P. Since such reductions allow use of extra randomness, we need to ensure that it does not affect the high-probability statement by much. We do this using the Markov's inequality and careful interpretation of the extra randomness.
Second, if problem P admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to the local-max-cut with (arbitrary) complete, then P has smoothed (quasi-polynomial) polynomial complexity. Here, the analysis builds on the first result, but also crucially depends on the rank-based analysis of [ER14] and [ABPW17] for the local-max-cut.
The meta-results allows us to extend smoothed efficient algorithm from one problem to another. Ideally we would like to show strong reductions. However, we manage to show weak reductions from k-NetCoordNash to 1-or 2-FlipMaxCut. Note that, smoothed complexity of 2-FlipMaxCut is not known yet, but we believe that 2-FLIP algorithm may admit a similar rank-based analysis as FLIP. And that will give a smoothed efficient algorithm for k-NetCoordNash with arbitrary k.
k-NetCoordNash to 2-FlipMaxCut. The idea for the reduction is, given an instance of a Network Coordination Game, construct a graph whose locally optimal cuts can be mapped to strategy profiles, and the total cut value of said cuts is equal to the total payoff of the associated strategy profile. To do this, we construct a graph with nk + 2 edges, two terminals s and t, and nk nodes indexed by player-strategy pairs (u, i). Nodes s and t are connected to every other node in the graph, and for each player u and strategy i, there is an edge from node (u, i) to node (u, j) for all j = i. Furthermore, if player u and v share an edge in the game graph (i.e. play together), there is also an edge from (u, i) to (v, j) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Therefore, the cut graph is complete if and only if the game graph is. Call a cut S, T valid if it is an s-t cut with s ∈ S and t ∈ T , and if S contains at most one node (u, i) for each player u. Now, for any valid s-t cut, we can interpret this cut as determining a strategy profile as follows: If player u appears in S the cut paired with strategy i, then set σ u = i. Otherwise, set σ u = 0, a "dummy" strategy with bad payoff. Call this profile σ(S). We wish to choose edge weights such that all locally maximal cuts are valid cuts, and also such that for any valid cut S, the total cut value is equal to payoff(σ(S)).
To show that this reduction is indeed a smoothness-preserving reduction, it suffices to show that σ(S) is a PNE if and only if S is a local-max-cut up to 2 flips, and that for random payoffs with bounded density, the edge weights in the reduction also have bounded density, and are full-rank combinations of independent random variables. This last condition is guaranteed by choosing the edge weights as a full-rank, integer, linear combination of the payoff values. It remains to show that this is possible while ensuring the first condition. Indeed, we ensure that any non-valid cut can always be improved by flipping at least one node. Furthermore, we ensure that any valid cut has total cut value equal to the total payoff of the associated strategy profile. Since replacing σ u with σ ′ u is equivalent to dropping (u, σ u ) from the cut and adding (u, σ ′ u ), then any locally optimal cut up to two flips must be equivalent to a Nash Equilibrium. Thus, we achieve a weak reduction, proving Theorem 2.7.
2-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut. Here, we take a slightly different reduction, where there are n + 2 nodes in the graph, and any s-t cut is interpreted as follows: if u is on the same side as s of the cut, σ u = 1, otherwise, σ u = 2. The same analysis goes through, but now, locally max cuts up to one flip are Nash Equilibria, which provides a weak smoothness-preserving reduction from 2-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut, proving Theorem 2.6.
In this section we show that the better-response (BR) algorithm finds a pure NE of a k-strategy network-coordination game efficiently under the standard smoothness model (defined in Section 2.2). We show efficiency both with-high-probability (w.h.p.) and in expectation. We begin by restating the definition of the problem:
Smoothed k-NetCoordNash Problem. Given a k-strategy network-coordination game, defined by an undirected graph G = (V, E) and an (|E|k 2 )-dimensional payoff vector A, where each coordinate of A is an independent random variable supported on range [−1, 1] with density at most φ, find a pure NE (PNE) of the game.
Since the real-valued input to the k-NetCoordNash problem is stochastic, the running time of any algorithm will be stochastic, and the efficiency guarantees will be w.h.p. or in expectation. We define below our notation for the better-improvement algorithm (BRA) and its properties.
Definition 4.1. A better-response (BR) sequence is denoted as a sequence of (player, strategy) pairs S = (u 1 , i 1 ), (u 2 , i 2 ), . . .. We interpret S as a sequence of player moves, where on the t th move, player u t changes their strategy to play strategy i t . It is assumed that they were not already playing i t .
Notation. Throughout a BR sequence, the strategy profile of the players is changing. We recall the σ notation introduced in section 3.1: denote as σ 0 ∈ {1, . . . , k} n the initial strategy profile before the sequence S, and let σ t be the profile after the t th move. Hence, σ t differs from σ t−1 only in the entry for σ ut . That is, σ t ut = i t and σ t u = σ t−1 u ∀u = u t .
Definition 4.2 (Active, Inactive, Repeating, and Non-Repeating players.). Let S be a BR sequence, then player u is said to be active if it appears in the sequence, and otherwise, it is termed inactive. An active player u is said to be repeating if there exists some strategy i such that (u, i) appears at least twice in S, or if (u, σ 0 i ) appears in S at all. An active player which is not repeating is said to be non-repeating.
Notation. We denote as p(S) the total number of active players in the BR sequence S, p 1 (S) as the number of non-repeating players, and p 2 (S) as the number of repeating players. When the sequence is question is clear from context, we omit the S and use p, p 1 and p 2 , respectively.
The following lemma is the key probability bound used in [ER14, ABPW17] , and will also be key for our analysis.
Lemma 4.1 (Lemma A.1 [ER14] ). Let X ∈ R d be a vector of d independent random variables where each X i has density bounded by φ. Let α 1 , . . . , α r be r linearly independent vectors in Z d . then the joint density of ( α i , X ) i∈[r] is bounded by φ r , and for any given b 1 , b 2 , . . . ∈ R and ǫ > 0, 
The entries of L t are indexed by indices of payoff matrices, denoted ((u, i)(v, j)). The values of its entries are chosen as follows:
That is, every entry signifies if the corresponding payoff value gets added (+1), removed (−1), or unchanged (0), from the potential function. We denote this set as the transformation set of a sequence, and each vector L i as the transformation vector of the corresponding move.
The inner product L t , A gives the change in the total payoff of the player who makes a move at time t, hence also gives the change in the sum of payoffs due to the t th move of the entire game. Recall that this sum of payoffs of all players is the potential value associated with any strategy profile σ, and every BR move strictly increases the potential.
Definition 4.4. We introduce here the concept of minimum total improvement of a sufficiently long sequence. For a fixed sequence of moves, say S, the change in potential as time t progresses is a random variable, since the values being added and subtracted (the A payoff values) are random. Therefore, any sequence of moves S has some probability of being a BR sequence, i.e. a sequence of moves every one of which is an increase in the potential. We define the random variable ∆ N , which captures the total increase in potential of the worst BR sequence of length exactly N moves. Therefore, for any fixed sequence S of moves of length N , and any arbitrary initial profile σ 0 , either S is not a BR sequence under random payoffs A, or performing S increases the potential function by at least ∆ N .
From the above definition, note that all improving sequences of length at least N have at least ∆ N improvement.
The goal of the analysis below is to show that the probability that ∆ N is small for N = Ω(nk) is vanishingly small, which allows us to bound the total duration of a BR sequence.
Lemma 4.2. Let S be a BR sequence, and let L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . } be its transformation set. Then span({L 1 , L 2 , . . . }) contains at least p 2 (S)/2 independent vectors V 1 , . . . , V p 2 /2 , such that for all j, (i) the vector V j is a 0-1 combination of the L i 's, and (ii) the value V j , A does not depend on the strategies of the inactive players.
Proof. Fix a repeating player u, and denote its repeating strategy as i 0 . Let t 0 be the first time u moves to strategy i 0 , setting t 0 = 0 if i = σ 0 u . Let t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < · · · be all of the indices after t 0 in the sequence S for which u is the moving player. Let t s be the index where u first returns to strategy i 0 after t 0 . Formally, if S = (u 1 , i 1 ), (u 2 , i 2 ), · · · , then u t j = u for all j ≥ 1, i t 0 = i ts = i 0 , and i t j = i 0 for all 0 < j < s. Consider the vector V (u) = s j=1 L t j . Vector V (u) satisfies condition (i) by construction. We will show that it satisfies (ii), and that at least p 2 /2 of them must be linearly independent. Let v be any inactive player For simplicity of notation, denote the strategy i t j as i j . Consider the inner product V (u), A when restricted to the rows indexed by ((u, * )(v, * )):
Therefore, the inner product V (u), A is independent of the value of σ v . Since this holds for all v inactive, we have proved part (ii). Now, it suffices to argue that we may choose p 2 /2 of these vectors to be linearly independent. We begin by constructing an auxiliary graph G ′ = (V, E ′ ), where V is the set of players, and E ′ will be defined below. Let u be some repeating player, and define V (u) and i 0 as above. The V (u) vector can not be entirely 0, as this would imply that σ ts and σ t 0 are the same, and so the sequence could not have been strictly increasing. Let w(u) be any player such that V (u) has a non-zero entry in some ((u, * )(w, * )) row. Let Q be the set of the repeating players in S, and for each u ∈ Q, add the edge (u, w(u)) to E ′ . For each connected component C of G ′ , let r ∈ Q ∩ C be chosen arbitrarily, and let T be the BFS tree out of r. Let T 1 and T 2 be the set of nodes in C which are of odd or even distance from r along T , respectively. Let Q C be the larger of T 1 ∩ Q and T 2 ∩ Q, and finally, let Q ′ be the union of all the Q C 's.
We must have that (a) |Q ′ | ≥ |Q|/2 = p 2 /2, and (b) for every u ∈ Q ′ , it has a neighbour w / ∈ Q ′ along the BFS tree. (By construction, u is incident to at least one edge in G ′ ). Let w ′ (u) be this neighbour. Consider the collection of vectors V := {V (u) : u ∈ Q ′ }. It must be linearly independent since V (u) contains only non-zero entries in rows containing u, and is the only vector containing a non-zero entry in some ((u, * )(w ′ (u), * )) row. Thus, V must contain a diagonal sub-matrix. Since |Q ′ | ≥ p 2 /2, we have our desired result.
In Section 2.1 we argued that a BR sequence improves the potential payoff function (1) of the game in every step. The next lemma bounds the probability of this improvement being very small. Lemma 4.3. The probability that a BR sequence S of length ℓ has a total improvement in potential at most ǫ is at most (ℓφǫ) p 2 (S)/2 , where p 2 (S) is the number of repeating players in S.
Proof. The improvement in potential due to each move in S is given by L i , A , where L i ∈ L is the transformation vector of the i th move. The probability that the maximum improvement in the sequence S is at most ǫ, is at most the probability that the improvement due to every move is at most ǫ -given that S is a sequence of increasing moves. Formally,
We cannot directly bound the right-hand term of the inequality, though, as we are using the 0-1 combinations thereof from Lemma 4.2.
. . , V p 2 /2 be these independent 0-1 combinations. Since m ≤ ℓ, we have:
Smoothed Quasi-polynomial Complexity for Arbitrary Graphs
In this section we show the quasi-polynomial running time when the game graph G is arbitrary, and thus prove Theorem 2.2.
Definition 4.5. Recall the random variable ∆ from definition 4.4. Call a sequence of length ℓ log-repeating if it contains at least ℓ/(5 log(nk)) repeating moves (pairs). We denote as ∆(ℓ) the minimum total potential-improvement after any log-repeating BR sequence of length exactly ℓ.
The analysis will build on the following lemma about "improving sequences". The proof of the above lemma is a pigeon-hole type argument which argues that any sequence on 5nk pairs must contain some contiguous sub-sequence which is log-repeating. Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, it suffices to bound ∆(ℓ). The next theorem proves Theorem 2.2 Theorem 4.5. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, any execution of a BR algorithm where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most φ · (nk) O(k log(nk)) steps, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k).
Proof. This proof closely matches that of [ER14] . The main differences lie in Lemma 4.2, proved above. We first bound the probability that a fixed, log-repeating sequence (defined in Definition 4.5) is a BR sequence but has small improvement.
Let S be an arbitrary sequence of ℓ BR moves such that at least ℓ/(5 log(nk)) distinct moves appear at least twice. Since each player has k strategies, it can only appear in k distinct moves. Hence, there must be at least ℓ/(5k log(nk)) repeating players. Applying Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we have that the probability that the total improvement due to S is at most ǫ, is at most (ℓφǫ) ℓ/(10k log(nk)) .
Let ∆(ℓ) be as defined in Definition 4.5. We wish to take a union bound over all choices of S (of length ℓ) and over all initial strategy profiles, which will allow us to bound the probability of ∆(ℓ) ∈ (0, ǫ). As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 4.2, the V i vectors which were used to show Lemma 4.3 did not depend on the values of the inactive nodes. Therefore, to determine the values of the inner products V j , A as in the proof of the lemma, it suffices to fix the initial strategy profiles of at most ℓ active players, rather than all n. Thus, taking a union bound over all (nk) ℓ choices of sequence, and over all k ℓ initial strategy profiles of the active nodes,
Setting ǫ = φ −1 (2n 2 k 3 ) −2·10k log(nk) , this gives
Let ∆ 5nk be the improvement in potential in any length 5nk BR sequence. Then using Lemma 4.4, and taking the union bound over all choices of ℓ, we have,
Hence, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k) (over the draw of payoff vector A), all BR sequences of length 5nk will have total improvement at least ǫ. In that case, any execution of BR algorithm makes an improvement of at least ǫ every 5nk moves. Since the total improvement is at most 2n 2 , we conclude that the total number of steps is at most 5nk · 2n 2 /ǫ = 10n 2 k(2n 2 k 3 ) 20k log(nk) · φ = φ · (nk) O(k log(nk)) , and this occurs with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k).
Smoothed Polynomial Complexity for Complete Graphs
In this section, we generalize the results of [ABPW17] to prove that the BR algorithm terminates on NetCoordNash games on complete graphs in time polynomial in φ and (nk) k , with high probability over the random draws of the payoff values of the game.
Recall that, the main idea is to bound the rank of the transformation set of a polynomially long BR sequence, and take a union bound over all sequences to obtain a lower bound on the minimum improvement in potential after any such BR sequence. For proving a high rank of a Θ(nk) length improving sequence, as described in Section 3.1, divide sequences into three types: (a) all n players are active in the sequence, or (b) at least one player is inactive and the number of repeating players (p 2 ) is higher than the non-repeating ones (p 1 ), or finally (c) at least one player is inactive and the number of non-repeating players is higher than the repeating ones (p 1 ≥ p 2 ).
We now prove the rank of an arbitrary sequence of the first type.
Lemma 4.6. In a BR sequence, if all players are active, the rank of the sequence is at least n − 1.
Proof. For every player u, let t u be the first instance in S of a move by player u, and suppose the t u th move was (u, i u ). Without loss of generality, suppose player n is the last to move. Consider the submatrix formed by selecting the L tu columns for all players u = n, and the rows ((u, i u )(n, σ 0 n )). It is easy to see that the only non zero entry in row ((u, i u )(n, σ 0 n )) is in the column L tu for all u. Therefore, this submatrix is diagonal, and the diagonal entries are non-zero, so the rank of L is at least the rank of this submatrix, which is n − 1.
For the remaining two cases, we denote the inactive player as n, and her initial strategy as σ 0 n as usual. For the second case, that is when the graph is complete and p 2 ≥ p 1 , it will suffice to use Lemma 4.2 to show that the sequence has high rank. It remains to show that the sequence has high rank in the converse case, when not all players are active, and p 1 ≥ p 2 .
Definition 4.6 (Transition Blocks). Similarly to [ABPW17]
, we will define the notion of transition blocks. There are however some key differences. For each non-repeating player u, let t u be the time period at which the player u appears in S for the last time. In other words, since u is non-repeating, σ t (u) = σ tu (u) for t ≥ t u , and σ t (u) = σ tu (u) for 0 < t < t u . We denote the non-repeating players as {1, 2, . . . , p 1 } and without loss of generality, assume t i < t j for i < j.
Partition the sequence S into blocks T 0 , . . . , T p 1 , where T i starts at t i + 1 and ends at t i+1 − 1, setting t 0 = 0 and t p 1 +1 = ℓ. If two non-repeating nodes appear consecutively, then the associated block will be empty. The non-empty T i blocks are referred to as transition blocks.
Definition 4.7 (Return Move). For a block B of BR moves, we say that pair (u, i) is a return move of B, if block B starts at time t + 1, and σ t u = i.
Lemma 4.7. Let S be a flip sequence partitioned into transition blocks T 0 , . . . , T p 1 (S) . For a block T of moves, let d(T ) and q(T ) be respectively the number of distinct (player, strategy) pairs and the number of return moves of T . Then the sequence has rank at least p 1 (S) +
Proof. Let L = {L 1 , L 2 , . . . } be the transformation set of the sequence. Just as in the previous Lemma 4.6, we will demonstrate a square, full-rank sub-matrix of L of dimension p 1 (S) +
. From this, we conclude that L has rank at least this desired quantity. We begin by choosing the columns of the submatrix. For every non repeating player u, select every column L t if player u moves at time t. For every transition block T , select the transformation vector of the first appearance of every player-strategy pair in T , except for those of the return moves for the transition block. That is, if Q(T ) denotes the set of all return moves of T , select the transformation vector corresponding to every move (u, i) ∈ T a \Q(T a ) for all 0 ≤ a ≤ p 1 . Let L be the set of all selected vectors. For the purposes of the full-rank submatrix, assume that the columns of L are sorted in the order in which they appear in S.
To make a full-rank, square submatrix, we will pair one row with each column. Re-order the rows so that they appear in the same order as their paired columns. For every column representing a move (u, i) where either u is non-repeating, or it is the first appearance of the pair (u, i) in the transition block T 0 , pair the row ((u, i), (n, σ 0 n )) with that column. For every other column, the corresponding pair (u, i) belongs in a transition block following some non repeating player v's first move. Let (v, j) be the first move of player v, and associate to this column the row ((u, i), (v, j)).
It remains to show that this submatrix is upper triangular, implying it has full rank. Recall that the ((u, i), (v, j)) entry of any L t column can only be non-zero if at time t, the moving player is either u or v.
• If the t th row corresponds to some ((u, i), (n, σ 0 n )) row, then the row can only be non-zero if player u is moving, since n is inactive. Furthermore, we have paired this row with the column where u first plays strategy i, and therefore, the row must have been zero below the diagonal.
• Otherwise, the move must correspond to that of a non-returning move for some transition block. Suppose the column is paired with row ((u, i), (v, j)) where player u is the moving player in this column, and player v is the player whose move defines the transition block. The ((u, i), (v, j)) row can only be non-zero after the beginning of the block, since it was the first time player v moves to j. Furthermore, within the block, it can not have been non-zero before u's first move to i, since (u, i) is not a return move for the transition block. Therefore, the row must be zero before the diagonal.
Thus, we have shown that L contains a square, full-rank submatrix of dimension p 1 (S) +
Note that this rank bound is significantly larger than that of Lemma 4.2. However, for the latter, it was important that the vectors considered do not depend on the strategy profile of the inactive players. In the final probability calculation, Lemma 4.2 may be paired with a naïve union bound, as was done in Section 4.1. However, for Lemma 4.7, we will need the following more sophisticated probability calculation, as was also needed in [ABPW17] .
In what follows, we proceed similarly to Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 2.2, in the case where p 1 (S) ≥ p 2 (S). For the above bounds to be useful, we first establish the existence of a so-called "critical block" in any sequence with sufficiently many distinct pairs. Note that the number of return moves for every subsequence depend on the strategy assignment at the start of that subsequence, and not the assignment σ 0 at the start of the entire BR sequence. In what follows, we will restrict our attention to some critical block B in the BR sequence, rather than the whole sequence. Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 can be applied directly to B if p 2 (B) ≥ p 1 (B). Thus, it remains to prove the rank bound for the converse case when p 1 (B) ≥ p 2 (B).
Claim 4.9. The transformation set of a critical block B with p active players has rank at least
Proof. Applying Lemma 4.7 to a critical block, and using the relations ℓ(B) ≥ 2(d(B) − q(B)) and ℓ(T ) < 2(d(T ) − q(T )) for the entire block B and for every transition block T within B proves the claim. Formally:
Definition 4.9. Recall the notation ∆(ℓ) from Definition 4.5. We similarly define ∆ ′ (p) as the minimum total increase due to any critical block with exactly p active players, where the initial strategy profile is arbitrary. We also denote as ∆(p) the minimum total increase taken over critical blocks with p active players where p 2 ≥ p 1 , and ∆(p), the converse. Thus, ∆ ′ (p) = min{∆(p), ∆(p)}.
We prove bounds on ∆(p) and∆(p) in the following two lemmas.
Proof. Applying Lemma 4.3 we take a union bound over all possible sequences and initial configurations of critical blocks that have p players. If the critical block has length l, then the number of distinct player-strategy pairs is at most l, giving a trivial bound of k ℓ on the number of initial strategies. Also, there can be at most (nk) ℓ distinct length l blocks, which result in the bound:
Proof. The idea is again to take a union bound over all possible sequences and initial strategy profiles. The naive union bound used in the proof of Lemma 4.10 is insufficient here when the number of active players is small compared to the length of the sequence. Hence, we first prove a more sophisticated union bound.
Intuitively, for a fixed BR sequence, we analyze the number of players that influence the improvement in potential, and the number of distinct values of each player that appear in the ∆(p) expression. The number of distinct BR sequences will then be the number of choices of all these values.
Recall the potential function payoff(σ) from (1), which represents the sum of the payoffs on all game edges at strategy σ. For simplicity of notation, let H(t) represent the value of this potential function after t steps of BR algorithm, and let H(0) represent this potential for the initial strategy profile.
As H(0) is a constant for any one execution of BRA, we will instead consider the improvements up to time t and denote it by H ′ (t) := H(t) − H(0), which will be helpful in the analysis that follows.
We wish to determine the value of L t , A = H(t) − H(t − 1) = H ′ (t) − H ′ (t − 1).
Since the potential function is separable, we partition the sum into three parts (similar to [ABPW17] ): H 0 (t) denotes the sum of the payoffs over all game edges incident to two inactive players, H 1 (t), the sum over all game edges incident to one active and one inactive player, and H 2 (t), the sum of payoff over all game edges adjacent to two active players. For the purposes of the definitions of H 0 , H 1 , and H 2 , we consider the player n, who was our inactive player for edges in the rank bound, to be "active". This is because we need the high-rank submatrix from Lemma 4.7 to entirely consist of edges which contribute to H 2 . We get
However, since the value of H 0 remains unchanged, we have that H ′ (t) depends only on H 1 (t), H 2 (t), H 1 (0), and H 2 (0). For our fixed sequence S, the values of H 2 (t) and H 2 (0) depend only on the initial strategies of the active players, and thus a union bound over all initial strategy profiles of the active players suffices to determine its value. It remains then to determine the value of H ′ 1 (t) := H 1 (t) − H 1 (0). This value can be expressed as follows:
We are, however, more interested in the difference (H ′as desired.
Lemma 4.12. Given an improving sequence of length 2nk, the minimum improvement after performing all moves in the sequence is at least ǫ = (nkφ) −O(k) with probability 1 − 1/poly(φ, n, k).
Proof. We analyze separately the cases where the number of active players is exactly n and less than n. In the first case, we use the rank bound of Lemma 4.6 for a given sequence and take a union bound over all initial strategy profiles, and all possible sequences to get
In the converse case, we combine Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11, then take a union bound over all possible values of p to bound the probability for any sequence of the given length. As defined previously, ∆ ′ (p) = min{∆(p), ∆(p)} and so,
Thus, setting ǫ = 100φ 2 n 3 k 4 −4k−4 , and taking the union bound over all choices of p, we get
Theorem 4.13. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash on a complete game graph, and with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of BRA where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most (nkφ) O(k) steps, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k, φ).
Proof. Lemma 4.12 directly implies the theorem. Just as in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we begin by partitioning the BRA sequence into blocks of length 2nk. Each such block must contain a critical block, and therefore with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k, φ) every partition increases by at least ǫ = (nkφ) −O(k) Since the total improvement is at most 2n 2 , since there are only n 2 games, this implies that the BR algorithm can only make at most 2n 2 (nkφ) O(k) moves. Since making one move takes time polynomial in n and k, we have the desired result.
Expected Smoothed Time Complexity
The analysis in the previous section establishes smoothed complexity of network-coordination games with respect to the with high probability notion. Another aspect of smoothed analysis is to analyze the expected time of completion of the algorithm. In this section, we provide a theorem to obtain expected time results from the with high probability bounds. The results are presented in a general form to allow application to any problem in PLS that has a bounded total improvement in potential value.
Theorem 5.1. Given a PLS problem with input size N , potential function range [−N r 1 , N r 2 ], and a local-search algorithm A to solve it, let d be the number of distinct choices the algorithm has in each step and let Λ be the total size of the search space of the algorithm. For an instance I drawn at random with maximum density φ, suppose the probability that any length-N β sequence of improving moves of A results in total improvement in the potential value at most ǫ, is at most
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the result of [ER14] . As we have stated it in a more general form, the analysis is included for completeness.
The maximum improvement possible before A terminates is the maximum change in the potential function value, given by N r 2 + N r 1 . For any integer t ≥ 1, if the algorithm requires more than t steps to terminate, then there must exist some subsequence of length N β that results in an improvement in the potential value of less than N β (N r 2 + N r 1 )/t ≤ 2N β+max{r 2 ,r 1 } /t. We denote r := max{r 1 , r 2 }.
We define a random variable T as the number of steps A requires to terminate. Using the notation ∆(N β ) to denote the minimum total improvement in a length-N β sequence of the algorithm A, this gives the probability of A running for more than t steps as:
+β+r , and compute the probability of T ≥ γi for any integer i:
We now sum over all values of t, by using that Pr[T ≥ t] ≤ Pr[T ≥ t · ⌈t/γ⌉], and compute the expected time steps as:
Thus, replacing the value for γ, the expected runtime is at most O(N β+r g(N )(φN ) f (N )g(N ) ln Λ).
Corollary 5.2. The smoothed expected time of BR algorithm for all network-coordination games is polynomial in (n (k log(nk)) , φ).
Proof. From equation 3 in Theorem 4.5, we know that the probability that the minimum improvement in a fixed BR sequence of length 5nk is at most ǫ, is at most 5nk ℓ=1 2n 2 k 3 (φǫ) 1/(10k log(nk)) l . Applying theorem 5.1, for N = nk and Λ ≤ k n , we get f (N ) = O(1), N r+β ≤ N 3 , and g(N ) = O(k log(nk)), and the result follows.
Corollary 5.3. For complete graphs, the smoothed expected time of BR algorithm for networkcoordination games is polynomial in (n k , φ).
Proof. From equation 7 in Lemma 4.12, for the case of complete graphs when a BR sequence has all active players, we have:
Similarly, from equation 4.2 in Lemma 4.12, the probability that the minimum improvement in a BR sequence of length 2nk is at most ǫ, is given by:
Combining these sums, we get the probability that a BR sequence of length 2nk has improvement at most ǫ is:
Applying theorem 5.1, for N = nk, N r+β ≤ N 3 , and Λ ≤ k n , we get f (N ) = O(1) and g(N ) = O(1), and the result follows.
Smoothness-Preserving Reduction to d-FlipMaxCut
Recall Definition 2.2 in Section 2.3, where we have defined a notion of Strong and Weak smoothness preserving reductions. As a reminder, search problem P is reduced to Q if random instances of P may be reduced to random instances of Q in such a way that the independence of the random inputs and the bounds on their density are preserved. The reduction is strong if independent random parameters in P produce independent random inputs to the reduced problem, and weak if the reduced parameters are instead linear combinations of independent random variables.
Recall from Definition 2.2 the d-FlipMaxCut problem of finding a cut in a weighted graph such that the value of the cut cannot be improved by performing up to d flips. In this section, we wish to provide a weak reduction from instances of k-NetCoordNash to 2-FlipMaxCut. Solving the smoothed complexity of 2-FlipMaxCut is a yet open problem, but it is not unlikely that it matches that of 1-FlipMaxCut, namely, quasi-polynomial smoothed complexity on arbitrary graphs, and polynomial smoothed complexity on complete graphs. We will show that, if this were true, than this implies the same would hold for k-NetCoordNash, independently of the value of k.
We first show that a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut on arbitrary graphs implies quasi-polynomial smoothed complexity.
Theorem 6.1. Let Q be a search problem with (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity, as defined above. Let P be a problem which admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to Q, given by f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , as in Definition 2.2. Then P has (quasi)polynomial smoothed complexity.
Proof. The algorithm for instances of P is as follows: 1) Perform the randomized reduction, 2) run the smoothed-(quasi-)polynomial-time algorithm for Q on the reduced instance, 3) Compute the solution to the instance of P given the solution to the reduced problem.
By the definition of smoothness-preserving reductions and (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity, step (2) will always correctly solve the reduced instance in finite time, and therefore step (3) will output a correct solution to the instance of P.
It remains then to show that the algorithm runs in polynomial time with high probability, which we do via Markov's inequality. Let (I, X) be an arbitrary instance of P where I is fixed, and X is a random vector whose entries have density at most φ. Let R be a random vector whose density is at most φ. Let φ ′ be the bound on the density of the reduced random input f 2 (X, R). Let A be the algorithm that solves instances of Q efficiently with high probability. Suppose that on random input f 1 (I), f 2 (X, R) , A runs in time (φ ′ |I||X|) c with probability 1−1/|I| c ′ taken over the random input (X, R). Then we wish to show that A runs in time (φ ′ |I||X|) c on input f 1 (I), f 2 (X, R) , with high probability over the input vector X. To this end, we define the indicator function B(I, X, R) which, for fixed values of I, X, and R, indicates whether A takes time greater than (φ ′ |I||X|) c . Thus, we wish to bound Pr X [B(I, X, R) = 1] = E X [B(I, X, R)] for all I fixed, and for R random. Letting δ = 1/|I| c ′ , we have
Therefore, with probability 1 − 1/|I| c ′ /2 , the algorithm A will solve the reduced instance in (quasi-) polynomial time. Since the values of φ ′ , |f 1 (I)| and |f 2 (X, R)| are all assumed to be polynomial in φ, |I|, and |X|, then the values c, c ′ can be assumed to be constants (or logarithmic, in the quasi-polynomial case), and we have our desired result.
Next we show that a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut gives an efficient algorithm.
Corollary 6.2. Let P be a problem which admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to localmax-cut on an (arbitrary) complete graph, then P has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity.
Proof. It suffices to show that local-max-cut has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity on (arbitrary) complete graphs, when the edge weights are full-rank linear combinations of independent random variables. This allows us to conclude, following the proof method of the previous theorem 6.1, that the reduction implies (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity for P. To see this, we observe that the analyses of [ER14, ABPW17] reduce to applying Lemma 4.1 to a high-rank collection of integer vectors, exactly as we have done in Sections 4 and 5. Furthermore, α, M X = M T α, X for any square matrix M . Therefore, we may restate the lemma as follows:
Claim 6.3. Let X ∈ R d be a vector of d independent random variables where each X i has density bounded by φ. Let α 1 , . . . , α r be r linearly independent vectors in Z d , and M a full rank matrix in R d×d with |M i,j | ≥ η > 0 for all i, j such that M i,j = 0. then the joint density of ( α i , M X ) i∈[k] is bounded by (φ/η) r . In particular, for all b 1 , b 2 , . . . ∈ R, and ǫ > 0,
The only difference from Lemma 4.1 is the addition of the matrix M . Note that as X is a vector of d independent random variables and M is a full rank matrix, the product vector M X is also a vector of d independent random variables. Further, as every element of X has density bounded by φ, and every entry of M is at least η, every element of the product M X has density bounded by φ/η. Hence, by applying the analysis to M X instead of X, the proof of the claim easily follows from that of Lemma 4.1.
We conclude that the smoothed (quasi-polynomial) polynomial complexity for local-max-cut on (arbitrary) complete graphs from [ER14, ABPW17] does not require edge-weights to be independent, but instead, it suffices to have edge weights which are full-rank, linear combinations of independent random variables, where the nonzero entries of M are bounded away from 0. Since the smoothed analysis of local-max-cut needs ǫ to be 1/poly(|X|, φ), it suffices to have η ≥ 1/poly(φ, |X|).
The rest of the analysis is identical to that of Theorem 6.1, where A is the FLIP algorithm.
We note that if it were possible to weakly reduce k-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut, then this would imply a (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity for k-NetCoordNash, where the degree of the polynomial does not depend on k. Unfortunately, we only achieve a weak reduction to 2-FlipMaxCut, which is likely to have similar smoothed complexity to 1-FlipMaxCut, though this is not as of yet known. We leave the smoothed analysis of 2-FlipMaxCut, and therefore of NetCoordNash for k variables, as an open problem.
Theorem 6.4. The problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Network Coordination Game with k strategies (k-NetCoordNash) admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut up to two-flips (2-FlipMaxCut). Furthermore, 2-NetCoordNash reduces to 1-FlipMaxCut.
Proof. Assume, first, that the payoff values of the coordination game are supported in [0.5, 1]. If the input is assumed to have been supported on [−1, 1], then this is simply an affine transformation of the input, and at most quadruples the maximum density. The idea of the reduction is to set up a graph such that every "good" cut can be mapped to a strategy profile, the total cut values of these "good" cuts are equivalent to the payoff of the associated strategy profile, and every locally maximal cut must be a "good" cut. Recall that the definition of smoothness-preserving reduction allows for extra randomness to be introduced. We will use this randomness to ensure that these conditions hold, and that the edge weights are simply a full-rank, integer combination of the payoff values and the extra random variables. Since the cut graph topology is only a function of the game graph topology, and the edge weights are only a function of the input payoff values and the extra random variables, this will be a valid reduction. It will suffice to argue that the density bound does not blow up, and that local max cuts up to two flips are exactly those "good" cuts which are mapped to PNE strategy profiles.
In this proof, the total payoff function for a strategy profile σ will be considered as
which is double the potential function considered in the previous sections. This will be necessary to ensure that the linear system has integer entries. To have our payoff value be equal to that of the standard potential function, it suffices to halve the payoff values, which at most doubles the density of the random variables. (Alternatively, we may set η = 1 2 in the proof of Theorem 6.1.) The reduction is as follows: given an instance of k-NetCoordNash on game graph G, we construct a graph with nk + 2 edges, two terminals s and t, and nk nodes indexed by player-strategy pairs (u, i). Nodes s and t are connected to every other node in the graph, and for each player u and strategy i, there is an edge from node (u, i) to node (u, j) for all j = i. Furthermore, if player u and v share an edge in the game graph (i.e. play a game together), there is also an edge from (u, i) to (v, j) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Therefore, the cut graph is complete if and only if the game graph is.
Call a cut S, T valid if it is an s-t cut with s ∈ S and t ∈ T , and S contains at most one node (u, i) for each player u. Now, for any valid s-t cut, we can interpret this cut as determining a strategy profile as follows: If player u appears in S paired with strategy i, then set σ u = i. Otherwise, set σ u = 0, a "dummy" strategy with bad payoff. Call this profile σ(S). We wish to choose edge weights such that all locally maximal cuts are valid cuts, and also such that for any valid cut S, the total cut value is equal to payoff(σ(S)). We denote as A((u, i)(v, j)) the payoff value for the uv game, when player u plays strategy 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and player v plays strategy 0 ≤ j ≤ k. This is simply to disambiguate the A uv (i, j) notation We will, however, use this latter notation when space does not permit the former. Letting 0 denote the dummy strategy, we assume that A((u, i)(v, 0)) = Y (u, i) for all v = u, and A((u, 0)(v, 0)) = A 0 for all u = v. The underlined values denote new random variables which are not given by the instance of k-NetCoordNash.
Since the variables A 0 and Y (u, i) are in our control, we assume that they are drawn independently at random, and are supported on [0, 0.5). This ensures that any Nash Equilibrium must entirely consist of non-zero strategies, since we have assumed A((u, i)(v, j)) ∈ [0.5, 1] for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. To minimize the density of the new random variables, we may assume that the distribution is uniform. For the purposes of the cut graph, we will also need random variables W (u, i) for all players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and R(u, ij) for all u and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. We assume the W and R variables to be i. i 1 ) , . . . , (u ℓ , i ℓ )}) denote the value payoff σ {s, (u 1 , i 1 ), . . . , (u ℓ , i ℓ )} , where π stands for "payoff." We wish to choose edge weights w such that (i) For every valid cut S, T , δ(S) = payoff(σ(S)) = π(S \ {s}),
(ii) for every player u and 1
(iii) and for every pair (u, i) ∈ S, w((s, (u, i))) = W (u, i).
The rest of the proof is contained in the 3 following claims, which we will at the end of this section:
Claim 6.5. Condition (i) is satisfied if and only if (a) δ({s, (u, i)}) = π({(u, i)}) for all players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and (b) w((u, i),
Claim 6.6. The edge weights which satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are a full-rank, square, integer-valued, linear combination of the random variables A uv (i, j), Y (u, i), A 0 , R(u, ij), and W (u, i) for all choices of u, v, i, j.
Claim 6.7. If conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied, then all local-max-cuts-up-to-2-flips are valid cuts, and their associated strategy profiles are Nash Equilibria.
Thus, we have provided a reduction from an instance of k-NetCoordNash to an instance of 2-FlipMaxCut, such that any solution to the reduced instance of 2-FlipMaxCut directly translates to a solution to the original instance of k-NetCoordNash, the edge weights of the cut graph are a fullrank linear combination of the game payoff values and the extra random variables, and the linear combinations are integral. Therefore, we have provided a weak smoothness-preserving reduction from k-NetCoordNash on complete (resp. arbitrary) game graphs to 2-FlipMaxCut on complete (arbitrary) graphs.
In the case k = 2, we slightly modify the reduction to not include a dummy strategy. Simply create a graph on n + 2 nodes labeled as s, t, and one for each player in the Network Game. We say that every s-t cut S, T is valid, and define σ(S) as setting σ u = 1 if u ∈ S, and σ u = 2 if u ∈ T . Then w(s, u) = W (u), w(u, v) = A((u, 1)(v, 2)) + A((u, 2)(v, 1)) − A((u, 1)(v, 1)) − A((u, 2)(v, 2)), and the rest of the proof goes through. Since the default ("no node selected") strategy is one of the two possible strategies. every local max cut up to one flip must map to a PNE, as desired.
Corollary 6.8. If 2-FlipMaxCut has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity on (arbitrary) complete graphs when inputs are independent combinations of independent random variables, then NetCoordNash has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity on (arbitrary) complete game graphs for k in the input, rather than for fixed k. 
For (8), note first if there is no uv edge in the game graph, then A uv does not appear on either side of the equality, and we may restrict our attention to pairs which form game edges. Now, for every v and w which do not appear in the S, the left-hand-side has 2A vw (0, 0), and the right-handside has 2(ℓ − (ℓ − 1))A vw (0, 0) from the first line. If u appears with strategy i, and v does not appear in S, then the left-hand-side has 2A uv (i, 0), and the right-hand-side has 2A uv (i, 0) from the π({(u, i)}) term. If u appears with strategy i, and v appears with strategy j, then the left hand side has 2A uv (i, j), and the right hand side has 2A uv (i, 0) and 2A uv (0, j) from the π({(u, i)}) and π({(v, j)}) terms which are canceled out by the second line, 2(ℓ − 2 − (ℓ − 1))A uv (0, 0) terms from the first line which is canceled out by the second line, and the term 2A uv (i, j) from the second line.
A similar argument shows the validity of (9). Since condition (i) requires that π({u, i}) = δ({s, (u, i)}), this is necessary. In the case ℓ = 2, this implies that w((u, i)(v, j)) must be equal to A uv (i, 0) + A uv (0, j) − A uv (0, 0) − A uv (i, j) = Y (u, i) + Y (u, j) − A 0 − A uv (i, j). Finally, setting w((u, i)(v, j)) to this value fulfills condition (i) for all values of ℓ, as desired.
Proof of Claim 6.6: The edge weights which satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are a full-rank, square, integer-valued, linear combination of the random variables A uv (i, j), Y (u, i), A 0 , R(u, i, j), and W (u, i) for all choices of u, v, i, j.
The previous claim allows us to set up the following system: w(s, (u, i)) = W (u, i) 
We observe first that (14) adds the values of the previous numbered equations to the value of w((u, i), t). Therefore, it suffices to perform simple row-elimination to get w((u, i), t) = π({u, i}) − W (v, j). Now, let G = (V, E) be the underlying game graph, and let d(u) be the number of games that player u participates in, i.e. the degree of u in the game graph. Then π(∅) = 2|E|A 0 , 
W (u, i)
. . .
It is easy to check that the * values are integral, since H values must be even combinations of the A values. Therefore, after the row-operations leading to w((u, i), t) values, the matrix is uppertriangular, which implies that the system is full-rank, square, and integral, as desired.
Proof of Claim 6.7: If conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied, then all local-max-cuts-up-to-2-flips are valid cuts, and their associated strategy profiles are Nash Equilibria.
Recall that we have assumed that 0.5 ≤ A uv (i, j) ≤ 1 for all edges uv and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, that 0 ≤ A 0 , Y (u, i) < 0.5 for all players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and that −1 ≤ R(u, ij), W (u, i) < 0 for all players u and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
We wish to show, first, that any local max cut must be an s-t cut. Without loss of generality, assume that all cuts considered do not include t, since it suffices to take the complement of the cut set. Thus, it suffices to argue that for any set S of vertices containing neither s nor t, that δ(S ∪ {s}) − δ(S) > 0. The two cuts may only differ on edges incident to s. The positive term includes w(s, t) and W (u, i) for all (u, i) / ∈ S, and the negative term includes W (u, i) for all (u, i) ∈ S. However, we know from (12) that w(s, t) = H(∅) − (u,i) W (u, i). Therefore, we get Now, it remains to show that any locally optimal s-t cut must be valid. It is well known that cut functions in undirected graphs are submodular, and therefore for any S not containing s, (u, i), or (u, j), Thus, conditions (ii) and (iii) are sufficient to guarantee that all local max cuts are valid cuts, and therefore local max cuts up to two flips must also be valid cuts. Condition (i) implies that the value of a valid cut is equal to its associated strategy profile. However, for any strategy profile σ, if S is the valid cut associated to σ, and player u benefits from replacing σ(u) with i ′ , then this implies that S − (u, σ(u)) + (u, i ′ ) is a cut with greater value, which is a 2-flip move. Therefore, S can only be a max-cut-up-to-2-flips if its associated strategy profile forms a Nash Equilibrium, and by construction, this strategy profile must consist of non-zero strategies.
